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action or later. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 6.7.0.) in /home/bestlifeschedule/public_html/wp-includes/functions.php on line 6121Kyle Handley<\/a>\n<\/p>\n Recent critiques of international economics may surprise many actual economists. The latest rap against my profession is that we economists were too ideological and optimistic about the benefits of\u00a0open\u00a0trade and global markets while ignoring job losses, industrial decline, and economic distress in the United States. One recent\u00a0op-ed\u00a0went so far as to suggest trade policymakers do the exact opposite of what economists suggest. Recent tariff announcements from the Trump administration indicate this mindset may have already taken hold.<\/p>\n This narrative is seductive, but it\u2019s also selective and false. Doubling down on protectionism will only entrench special interests who work to sustain a different, flawed system that delivers private gains at the nation\u2019s expense.<\/p>\n To the frustration of many presidents<\/a>, economists have earned their \u201cdismal science\u201d moniker by attaching ranges, uncertainty bounds, and warnings to their advice and predictions. While most economists would argue with certainty that there are overall gains from trade liberalization, they\u2019re quick to add that there will be winners and losers.<\/p>\n But if you do the opposite by raising trade barriers, not only will there be winners and losers, there will also be net losses, along with new interest groups defending the protectionist spoils. An important objective of economics is to measure properly and attribute gains and losses, independently of which groups yell loudest.<\/p>\n Perhaps economists did not always emphasize the losses part of the ledger enough. It\u2019s also true that many economists didn\u2019t understand how long it would take for labor markets and displaced workers to adjust to shocks of any type, not just those from import competition. New research (from economists!) has shed light on the adjustment challenge, and\u2014far from being bound to any ideology\u2014my colleagues and I have quickly incorporated it into our work.<\/p>\n Yet this doesn\u2019t mean the\u00a0overall gains<\/em>\u00a0from trade were wrong\u2014and economists have created a substantial volume of research and new models to better understand it. If anything, this new work shows that the gains from globalization are larger than we thought and would be more costly to dismantle.<\/p>\n In short, the focus has changed, but the consensus has not.<\/p>\n Over the past 40\u00a0years, the field of international economics has undergone a significant shift in its understanding of globalization\u2019s effects. In the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant view was that free trade always led to net gains. Classical trade models based on the theory of comparative advantage suggested that while trade might cause short-term dislocations, the economy would adjust, reallocating resources efficiently and increasing overall productivity.<\/p>\n However, by the early 2000s, empirical research began to challenge the adjustment part of the equation. Studies on the \u201cChina Shock\u201d<\/a>\u2014the surge in Chinese imports after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001\u2014showed that certain labor markets in the US suffered lasting economic harm. Workers in industries relatively more exposed to Chinese competition faced prolonged unemployment and wage declines.<\/p>\n Suddenly, a raft of new research reexamined the issue from both sides. Some research showed many social costs of import competition shocks, and other work<\/a> argued that jobs from new export market opportunities more than made up for the jobs lost in some sectors. There was substantial job reallocation in affected labor markets, but it was away from manufacturing and into service sector employment in R&D, management, transportation, and warehousing<\/a>. Unfortunately, these new jobs were not in the locations or in the same sectors that lost jobs.<\/p>\n But here is the rub in the China Shock narrative: Economists devoted too much of their attention to explaining every nuanced and downstream causal effect of Chinese import competition. While spotlighting those effects was correct, they offer an incomplete story that has come to dominate the public narrative.<\/p>\n Economists know for certain that\u2014contra the anti-globalization spin\u2014import competition has not been the only driver of US manufacturing job losses since 1990, or 2001, or 2008. For example, during the Great Recession, the United States lost more than 2 million US manufacturing jobs, but\u00a0imports collapsed too<\/em>. Manufacturing jobs have been declining as a share of employment since the 1950s and in nominal terms since 1979. These declines began long before the US signed NAFTA in 1994 or China joined the WTO in 2001.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n